Endogenous Norm Formation over the Life Cycle. The Case of Tax Evasion by Nordblom, Katarina
 Department of Economics 
School of Business, Economics and Law at University of Gothenburg  
Vasagatan 1, PO Box 640, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden  
+46 31 786 0000, +46 31 786 1326 (fax) 
www.handels.gu.se    info@handels.gu.se 
      
 
 
 
                WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
 
 
             No 511 
 
 
 
 
              Endogenous Norm Formation Over the Life Cycle  
 
          The Case of Tax Evasion 
 
 
 
 
             Katarina Nordblom and Jovan Žamac 
            
              
 
 
 
           June 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           ISSN 1403-2473 (print) 
            ISSN 1403-2465 (online) 
 
 
 
 
 
Endogenous Norm Formation Over the Life
Cycle – The Case of Tax Evasion ∗
Katarina Nordblom†and Jovan Zˇamac‡
June 30, 2011
Abstract
This paper oﬀers an explanation to why the general observation that
elderly hold stronger moral attitudes than young ones may be an age
rather than a cohort eﬀect. We apply mechanisms from social psychol-
ogy to explain how personal norms may evolve over the life cycle. We
assume that people update their norms inﬂuenced by their own past
behavior (e.g., cognitive dissonance) and/or by the attitudes of their
peers (normative conformity). We apply the theory on actual norm
distributions for young and old concerning tax evasion. Allowing for
heterogeneous updating of norms where only those who identify with
their network are actually conforming with it, while the others are
only inﬂuenced by their own past behavior, we can explain the dif-
ference between young and old people’s moral values as an age eﬀect
through endogenous norm formation.
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1 Introduction
The young are often claimed to be more immoral than the old. There are
numerous records of this view, but few as eloquently stated as by Socrates
more than 2000 years ago:
The children now love luxury; they have bad manners, contempt
for authority; they show disrespect for elders and love chatter in
place of exercise. Children are now tyrants, not the servants of
their households. They no longer rise when elders enter the room.
They contradict their parents, chatter before company, gobble up
dainties at the table, cross their legs, and tyrannize their teachers.
(Attributed to Socrates)
Today we have more than anecdotal evidence regarding this generational
diﬀerence in terms of attitudes and behavior in various contexts. List (2004)
ﬁnds that older individuals behave more cooperatively and altruistically than
middle aged and young ones. Halpern (2001) studies the World Values Sur-
vey and ﬁnds that older people hold stronger moral values concerning self-
interest, legal/illegal activities and personal/sexual matters. Moral values
and behavior are closely linked and values as such are important to study
since they to a large extent explain intentions and also actual behavior.1
This is particularly true for the policy important area of tax compliance
where personal and social norms have proven to be important determinants
of behavior. Moreover, also in this area several studies have found that the
young hold weaker norms than the elderly.2
The question is why the above mentioned diﬀerences in value judgements
have come about—is it a cohort eﬀect, so that the youth of today is com-
1See Tabellini (2008) and Torgler (2007) for two insightful discussions in diﬀerent con-
texts.
2Using survey data from the UK, Orviska and Hudson (2003) ﬁnd that young are
less reluctant than old to tax evasion and Devos (2008) ﬁnds that among Australians,
respondents (50+) are less tolerant to tax evasion than younger ones. McGee and Gelman
(2008) ﬁnd that older (50+) respondents are more negative to tax evasion than younger
ones in the US and a similar result is found by McGee and Tyler (2006) in their study of
tax-evasion attitudes in 33 countries.
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pletely diﬀerent from the older generation and will so remain? Or, may it
be an age eﬀect, i.e., are these value judgements endogenously determined
and evolve over the life cycle? The answer to this question is important. If
it is a cohort eﬀect, we may experience a downward spiral in moral values,
while an age eﬀect could indicate that today’s young are likely to become
similar to today’s old once they themselves turn old. (Reading the quote
from Socrates, might make us inclined to believe in the age eﬀect.) The
question of age versus cohort eﬀect is important, not least in the example of
tax evasion. E.g., there may not be an alarming deterioration of people’s tax
morale in general if the observed diﬀerences are due to an age aﬀect.
There are a few studies that have looked into the age versus cohort issue
concerning tax morale. Braithwaite et al. (2010) conclude that the diﬀerence
in taxpaying norms between young and old is more likely an age eﬀect than a
cohort eﬀect although their study uses cross-section data.3 Torgler and Valev
(2006) use panel data to study attitudes toward tax evasion and corruption,
and they observe an age eﬀect rather than a cohort eﬀect concerning both
issues. Even though these studies conclude that there is an age eﬀect, they
say nothing about the mechanisms giving rise to changes in moral values over
the life cycle. An age eﬀect implies that value judgements are endogenous
and therefore possible to aﬀect by policy.4 Trying to understand how such
value judgements evolve over the life cycle therefore has important policy
implications.
This paper thus ﬁlls a gap in the literature. It gives a new perspective on
the attitudinal diﬀerences between young and old by investigating how indi-
viduals may change their moral values through social psychology mechanisms
over the life cycle. There are several theoretical proposals of how personal
attitudes change and we will test diﬀerent mechanisms in a simulation model
to see which mechanism best ﬁts the observed diﬀerences. We allow for het-
3”Networks may place limits on how much drift is possible as taxpayers develop a tax
’history’ and ’routine’ that shapes the way in which they deal with tax in their later years.
The data seem most consistent with the drift interpretation and suggest that it is quite
plausible that with time the under-30s will become like the over-55s” (Braithwaite et al.,
2010).
4”If a government can inﬂuence a norm, tax evasion can be reduced by policy activities”
(Torgler, 2007, p. 67.)
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erogeneity in norm updating across individuals, who alter their preferences
due to own past behavior and/or due to their peers’ moral judgements.
Although we will analyze moral judgements speciﬁcally regarding tax
evasion, the line of reasoning is valid for a whole range of topics where moral
values are important for behavior.
The view that preferences are endogenously determined has long been
held by sociologists and psychologists. Recently it has been acknowledged
also in the economics literature that preferences are likely to be endogenously
formed by our behavior and surroundings, especially concerning issues involv-
ing social interactions (see, e.g., Bowles, 1998; Ostrom, 2000; Tabellini, 2008).
In the present paper, we extend the literature by presenting a dynamic evo-
lution of the norms, while previous papers have modeled endogenous norms
in static settings.5
Moreover, previous research on attitudes towards, e.g., tax evasion, has
been concerned with average (or individual) changes. Although both indi-
vidual and social norms have proven to be important for behavior and we
know that people hold very diﬀerent norms, we still know very little about
how they evolve over time in aggregate. Also the theories within social psy-
chology that have tried to explain how moral judgements change over time
have mostly focused on the individual level. In order to actually explain
what aﬀects norms in society, we need to consider the whole norm distribu-
tion, since diﬀerent norms may aﬀect people diﬀerently (see, e.g., Myles and
Naylor, 1996). Another novelty of the present paper is that we actually take
the whole distribution of norms into account. This allows us to distinguish
between diﬀerent potential norm-updating mechanisms, which would not be
possible if merely studying averages. To study the whole distribution is also
important from a policy perspective. If people on average do not approve of
evasion, while a few do and therefore evade a lot, this is still a problem that
we fail to address if averages are our only concern.
5See, e.g., Fischer and Huddart (2008), Lindbeck et al. (1999), Lindbeck et al. (2003),
and O¨stling (2009). Tabellini (2008) regards norm evolution over time in an intergenera-
tional setting, where parents choose what values to pass on to their children.
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In Section 2, we present actual moral judgements of a special kind of
tax evasion, namely buying black market services, by young and old and ask
whether endogenous norm evolution could explain the transition from one to
the other. Section 3 presents norm evolution theories. We will assume that
own past behavior aﬀects one’s personal attitudes as proposed by the theo-
ries of cognitive dissonance (see, e.g., Festinger, 1957; Akerlof and Dickens,
1982; Lieberman et al., 2001) and of self-signaling (see, e.g., Be´nabou and
Tirole, 2004, 2006, 2010). Hence, those who evade become less reluctant to
tax evasion and those who do not become more reluctant. An alternative
updating of norms is that people are inﬂuenced by their networks, e.g., by
family, friends, and colleagues, and tend to conform with their views as in
the normative conformity theory by, e.g., Deutch and Gerard (1955).
In Section 4 we set up a simple model where both personal and social
norms inﬂuence the decision of whether to evade or not. Then, we incorpo-
rate the proposed norm-updating mechanisms. The complexity of the model
(heterogeneous norm updating, history dependence, network eﬀects, and con-
sidering the whole distribution of preferences), makes it necessary to adopt
simulations. In Section 5, we therefore calibrate the model with actual num-
bers and simulate people’s behavior and norm changes in an intertemporal
setting using an agent-based model where cohorts come and go and people
interact with each other. None of our proposed updating mechanisms can
alone explain the transition. However, a combination where those who iden-
tify with their group and have lower than average moral standard tends to
conform with the values of one’s peers and the others are inﬂuenced by their
own past behavior, gives rise to the evolvement of attitudes that is actually
observed. Hence, we can oﬀer a plausible explanation for why there may
be an age eﬀect; we can, however, by no means prove that it is the only
(or true) explanation. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses some
potential policy implications.
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2 An illustrative example
Illustrative for the reasoning put forward in the introduction are the answers
in a survey made by the Swedish tax agency regarding buying black market
services. We use the question capturing the moral judgement rather than ac-
tual behavior for two reasons: First, everyone may make a moral judgement,
while not everyone has the need to buy the service or the possibility to do
it in the black market. Analyzing behavior would therefore imply selection
problems. Second, since buying black market services is illegal, it is ques-
tionable whether people would respond truthfully to a question about their
behavior. We therefore focus on moral values, and as already pointed out
this may indeed have an impact on actual behavior (which is also assumed in
the theoretical model in Section 4). Sweden is one of the countries with the
highest labor-income tax wedges in the world, implying large incentives to
trade services in the black market. The question we use to capture personal
attitudes to such activities is the following:
Do you agree or not with the statement: It is immoral to buy
black-market services.
The respondents could answer on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 meant Do
not agree at all and 7 meant Agree completely. Figure 1 shows how young
and old respondents responded to this statement; it is obvious that the two
groups diﬀer in their moral valuation. According to a t-test, the old have a
signiﬁcantly higher mean value than the young and a χ2-test rejects that the
two distributions are the same (in both tests, p = 0.000). The distribution
for the middle-aged lies between the two presented ones. The ﬁnding that
the old report higher aversion to buying black-market services is in line with
previous literature, as reported above, but we also note the diﬀerence in the
total distribution: The distribution for the old is more skewed than the one
for the young.6 This also points to why it is important to conduct the analysis
6Although we depart from one special question in one country, there are reasons to be-
lieve that there are similar diﬀerences in general. When looking at answers from people in
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Figure 1: Distribution of answers to whether it is immoral to buy black-
market services
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in terms of the whole distribution and not only average values. There is much
more information in the whole distribution and, as we will argue later on in
the paper, the key to how people’s attitudes change over time lies in the
study of the whole distribution since we allow for heterogenous agents. In
our agent-based simulations in Section 5, we calibrate our model with ﬁgures
from this survey. Although this is just one speciﬁc example, the way of
reasoning about endogenous norm updating mechanisms should be valid for
a wide range of topics where value judgements are important.
3 Theories of norm evolution
Theories concerning the evolution of moral values and norms have mainly
been proposed within social psychology (for a comprehensive overview, see
25 European countries to the statement ”Citizens should not cheat on taxes” in European
Social Survey, old are more prone to agree with the statement and the distribution for
their answers is more skewed than that for the young.
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Turner, 1991). Personal norms may change due to own past behavior, others’
behavior, others’ attitudes, or some combination of these.
One explanation to why people alter their personal norms is that one
adjusts them to ﬁt one’s actual behavior. One example is the theory of
cognitive dissonance, as ﬁrst presented by Festinger (1957), where if people
act in conﬂict with their attitudes they tend to change their attitudes to
ﬁt their behavior. Lieberman et al. (2001) ﬁnd that there can even be an
automatic attitude change from behavior. Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and
O¨stling (2009) are two examples from the economics literature of when one
chooses what personal attitude to hold in order to match behavior.According
to cognitive dissonance, people who, e.g., disapproves of tax evasion but
cannot resist the temptation and therefore evades will modify their attitudes
toward tax evasion in order to justify their behavior. Similarly, someone who
has not evaded will be (more) convinced that evasion is wrong. Since we
observe less people actually evading than not, this could be one explanation
to why people become more reluctant to evasion over time.
A related theory according to which personal norms are aﬀected by own
past behavior is the self-perception theory proposed by Bem (1972) and later
developed and incorporated in the economics literature as the self-signaling
theory (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2004, 2006, 2010). Self-perception and self-
signaling do in many cases yield similar predictions as cognitive dissonance,
yet the cause for attitude change is slightly diﬀerent. Behavior does not
create dissonance but instead reveals the personal norm to the individuals
who are unaware of their true preference before they act. On observing
or remembering their own behavior the individuals conclude what kind of
persons they are and what their attitudes should be in order to agree with
their actions. I.e., by the choice of evading or not, one signals to oneself
whether one is an evader or a non-evader. We will not directly distinguish
between self-signaling and self-perception, but analyze them interchangeably.
A diﬀerent form of attitude change may arise not due to own behavior
but through social interaction and the inﬂuence of others’ attitudes. Manski
(1993) deﬁnes social eﬀects as when the propensity of an individual to be-
have in a certain manner depends on the prevalence of that behavior in some
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reference group that the individual belongs to. Simply put, if the propensity
to buy black market services is high within one’s network, then the probabil-
ity that one will buy such services increases. We will, however, not restrict
this social interaction to concern observed behavior only, but instead allow
for a direct eﬀect from attitudes within the network. ”After all, humans do
communicate about all sorts of things,” as pointed out by Manski (2000).
The pioneering paper in the area was by Deutch and Gerard (1955), who
found that normative social inﬂuence makes people adopt views of others
(in a group). Hence, in their terminology, we focus on normative conformity
motivation, implying that one conforms to what the others view as right, as
opposed to informational conformity, which is rather concerned with con-
forming to what one knows that others do. This means that people tend
to adjust their attitudes toward those of the majority of their peers, and,
e.g., Wenzel (2005b) ﬁnds that social norms have a causal eﬀect on personal
ethics. Moreover, according to Terry and Hogg (1996) and Smith and Terry
(2003), the group norm should have a greater inﬂuence when one’s group
identiﬁcation is high, which is also supported by the empirical ﬁndings by
Wenzel (2004). This line of thought is also drawn by Cialdini and Goldstein
(2004) in their overview when they point at ﬁndings that people are more
likely to conform with the attitudes of more proximate than with those of less
proximate people. In economics, Bernheim (1994) was the ﬁrst to adopt and
develop the theory of conformity, but then rather as informational conformity
when one wants to do what the majority does, and Myles and Naylor (1996)
adopt it into a tax compliance setting. In our analysis, we adopt the idea
of normative conformity from social psychology and let attitudes themselves
conform to group norms.
Although endogenous preferences have been studied (see, e.g., Bowles,
1998; Ostrom, 2000) there are very few studies that actually do it in a dy-
namic setting and try to explain how they evolve over time. Some previous
studies use a static setting where individual preferences are formed simul-
taneously with the behavioral decision, e.g. Fischer and Huddart (2008),
Lindbeck et al. (1999), Lindbeck et al. (2003), and O¨stling (2009). Tabellini
(2008) regards norm evolution over time in an intergenerational setting where
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parents choose what values to pass on to their children. In the present pa-
per, we regard norms as endogenous and speciﬁcally study them in a dynamic
setting where we focus on how they evolve over the life cycle.
Azar (2004) presents a theoretical model for the evolvement of the social
norm of tipping. Akerlof (1980) claims that also social norms that are costly
to the individual will prevail, while Azar’s model predicts that such norms
will erode over time. In the present paper, we explicitly model the link
between personal moral values and social norms and ﬁnd that the long-run
equilibrium depends on the mix of updating mechanisms.
In the tax compliance literature, both social and personal norms have
been put forward as important for attitudes about tax evasion as well as
for actual behavior (see, e.g., Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Myles and Naylor,
1996; Wenzel, 2004, 2005a; Fortin et al., 2007; Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007).
These papers, however, have not dealt with the formation and evolution of
these norms. Myles and Naylor (1996) assume conformity with others’ eva-
sion behavior and Fortin et al. (2007) discuss that expectations about others’
behavior among other things inﬂuence the social cost of evading taxes. These
studies, however, assume exogenous norms of informational conformity. Wen-
zel (2004) also ﬁnds evidence of conformity, and that it is more important
if one identiﬁes with the group than if one does not. Wenzel (2005b) in-
vestigates in an experimental setting how personal and social norms aﬀect
tax compliance, and then in turn how tax compliance aﬀects norms, and
ﬁnds evidence that tax compliance actually has a causal eﬀect on personal
tax paying ethics. In this sense he actually endogenizes norms related to tax
compliance and through his controlled laboratory experiment he can actually
distinguish between exogenous and endogenous impacts. Also Torgler (2006)
ﬁnds evidence of endogenous personal norms concerning tax evasion in his
ﬁnding that religiosity aﬀects tax morale. Hence, there are good grounds to
assume that moral values in general and concerning tax evasion in particular
are endogenously determined and that they may change over time.
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4 A theory of buying black-market services
In a very simple partial equilibrium model, individuals live for two periods
and in each they have to decide whether they should buy a service in the
white or in the black market. For simplicity, we abstain from including any
supply side eﬀects, but assume that both markets are characterized by perfect
competition, so that buyers are price takers. Moreover, the services sold in
the black and in the white market are perfect substitutes in terms of result.
The diﬀerence in price between the two services is equal to the tax wedge.
We also assume that buying this service is something that has to be done
in each period, so the only choice for the individuals is whether to buy it in
the black or in the white sector and the choices in the two periods are made
independent of each other. Buying from the black sector is cheaper and leaves
more resources for consumption than buying in the white sector. However,
buying from the black market is illegal, and if one is detected buying black-
market services, one has to pay a sizable ﬁne, which reduces consumption
possibilities:
cb > cw > cf , (1)
where cb and cf are consumption if buying the black market service and
getting away with it and being ﬁned, respectively, while cw is consumption
if one buys the service in the white market. For simplicity, individuals are
homogeneous in terms of these consumption possibilities, which also are equal
across the two periods in life.7
Utility from consumption, u(c) is a quasi-concave function (and the same
for all individuals in the economy). In order to avoid trivial solutions, we
make the plausible assumption that
(1− p)u(cb) + pu(cf)− u(cw) > 0, (2)
where p is the exogenous, commonly known probability of being detected
7We abstract from savings and from any interdependency of utility in the two periods,
so that each decision is made in isolation.
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if buying in the black market. Hence, everyone faces the same material
incentives to buy the service in the black or white market, incentives that
imply that everyone would buy the service in the black rather than in the
white market if only expected utility of consumption mattered.
However, there may be a psychological disutility from buying a black
market service: The convex function ϕ(.) with ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = ∞
reﬂects the degree of guilt or shame that the individual experiences if she
buys the black market service, irrespective of whether she is detected by the
authorities or not. We assume that guilt is experienced if acting against one’s
personal moral norm and shame if acting against the social norm.8
We assume that people have an intrinsic moral attitude toward buying
black market services, γi ∈ [0, 1]. If γi = 0 one has no moral doubts about
buying black market services. At the other extreme where γi = 1, one
would never dream of violating the law, irrespective of the material payoﬀ.
Whenever γi ∈ (0, 1), there is a trade-oﬀ between economic incentives and
feelings of guilt when deciding whether to buy black or white market services.
Individuals diﬀer in terms of γi, and in their ﬁrst period of life, the value is
drawn from some speciﬁc distribution.
Each individual i has a unique social network, meaning that even if both
k and l are part of i’s network, they need not be part of each other’s. More-
over, the network inﬂuences the individual through their attitudes; one is
concerned with the approval or disapproval from family, friends, and col-
leagues. We assume that people talk freely within their networks, so that
the γ’s of everyone within it is known to the individual, as is their actual
behavior. We thus assume that the average moral attitude in the network,
γ¯i, is what may aﬀect utility through shame.
9 If one buys the black-market
service, one experiences shame if the network disapproves. Hence, the shame
if evading increases in the network’s average moral judgement.
8According to Erard and Feinstein (1994), shame is only felt when detected. However,
as will become clear below, an illegal action will always be detected by the peers.
9Myles and Naylor (1996), Lindbeck et al. (1999, 2003), and Fischer and Huddart (2008)
model conformity in terms of others’ actual behavior, where one wants to act in accordance
with the network’s average behavior. However, they do not consider information about
attitudes as such.
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Each individual i knows her own moral value, γi, and also the γ¯i of her
network. There will thus be both an intrinsic personal norm and a social
norm aﬀecting the utility of buying the service from the black market. These
two eﬀects can be joined in the psychological disutility of buying from the
black market:
ϕ
(
δγ + (1− δ)γ¯), (3)
where δ ∈ (0.5, 1] reﬂects the relative importance of the personal and social
norms. Since Wenzel (2004) found that personal ethics were more important
for compliance than were social norms, we assume that δ > 0.5.10
Individual i will buy from the black market if the material pay-oﬀ, as
presented in (2), exceeds the psychological disutility in (3), i.e., iﬀ
(1− p)u(cb) + pu(cf)− u(cw) > ϕ
(
δγi + (1− δ)γ¯
)
. (4)
This implies that people with low γi, i.e., a low degree of personal moral
doubts about black market services, are more likely to actually buy from the
black market, but so are those who belong to a social network where one, on
average, has low moral doubts about it.
4.1 Updating norms
Hence, like previous literature, we show how personal and social norms in-
ﬂuence decision making. However, in our model people live for two periods
and may therefore change their moral views as time goes by. We assume that
moral views may change via two mechanisms, namely through own behavior
and through inﬂuence from the network, as presented in Section 3.
10Also Fischer and Huddart (2008) model the norm as a weighted average of personal
and social norms, although they assume the latter to be the per-capita average level of
the actions of others.
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4.1.1 Cognitive dissonance and self-signaling
In our setting, the material payoﬀ from buying in the black-market sector may
be very high, so that condition (4) holds, although one has a strong moral
norm against buying black market services. Then, according to cognitive
dissonance, one is likely to adjust one’s personal ethics afterwards in order
to justify one’s behavior.
Hence, if one bought a black market service in Period 1, one becomes
less reluctant to doing so in the future (γi is reduced in accordance with
some parameter αb ≥ 0). Likewise, if one bought in the white market in
the ﬁrst period, then one’s personal ethics about not buying in the black
market grow even stronger in Period 2 (γi increases in accordance with some
αw ≥ 0). Moreover, the norm need not react to buying in the white and black
market symmetrically, i.e., αw is not necessarily equal to αb. This updating
mechanism is also consistent with the theories of self-perception and self-
signaling, although this interpretation is most plausible for those with γi in
the middle of the distribution.
If people update their norms in accordance with their own past behavior,
whether it is due to cognitive dissonance or self-signaling, we should see
a more polarized distribution of attitudes among old than among young.
Moreover, since most people do not buy black-market services (according
to our data about 30 % have bought such services), we would expect the
distribution for the old to be more skewed than for the young, something we
actually observe in Figure 1. However, that the peak in the middle of the
distribution seems to prevail among the older cannot be explained by this
updating mechanism of personal norms.
4.1.2 Conformity with network preferences
Not only one’s own past behavior determines how social human beings up-
date their personal norms; people discuss and inﬂuence each other. We thus
assume that due to normative conformity one conforms to the social norm,
measured as the average personal norm in the social network, γ¯, when up-
dating their own personal norm. This means that people with a personal
13
γi > (<)γ¯i will reduce (increase) their γ a bit to come closer to their peers.
If normative conformity with the network is decisive for updating the
personal norm, people should approach the middle of the distribution as
time goes by. This updating mechanism could thus explain that the peak
in the middle of the distribution is more pronounced among the old than
among the young. Yet the increased skewness or the change of the mean
is not supported by normative conformity updating. Hence, we need to
consider both cognitive dissonance and conformity in order to replicate the
change from the left panel to the right one in Figure 1 with dynamic norm
evolution.
When people update their personal norm, we therefore assume that both
mechanisms may be important and we allow for heterogeneity across individ-
uals. People react to new information diﬀerently: some alter their attitude
a lot and some almost nothing, given the same initial personal norm. We
therefore let the magnitude of the change depend on the stochastic parame-
ter θi ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, personal norms are updated between the two periods
of life according to
γi2 =
{
γi1 + θi
[
μi(γ¯i1 − γi1) + (1− μi)αw
]
if i bought white in Period 1
γi1 + θi
[
μi(γ¯i1 − γi1)− (1− μi)αb
]
if i bought black in Period 1
(5)
where μi ∈ [0, 1] determines the relative importance of own behavior and
the social norm for the updating process. This relative importance may
diﬀer across individuals and may itself be a function of where in the network
distribution γi is, so that one is more inclined to adopt the network norm if
one identiﬁes with the group than if one does not, something we will consider
in our simulations.
Our proposed updating mechanisms are also consistent with empirical
ﬁndings by Wenzel (2005b). He ﬁnds that personal ethics (corresponding to
our γi) aﬀect taxpaying behavior, which in turn aﬀects personal ethics in the
next period. In his study, he also ﬁnds that social norms have a causal eﬀect
14
on personal ethics.
Since none of the mechanisms alone seem to be able to fully explain the
observed diﬀerence in attitudes presented in Figure 1, we will analyze some
speciﬁc combinations of the mechanisms to be able to explain the attitudinal
change.
4.1.3 Specific updating mechanisms
The general updating rule in (5) contains several possible variations of up-
datings of the personal norm. Below, we present some speciﬁc mechanisms
that we also test in Section 5 to identify the most likely mechanism (or, com-
bination of mechanisms) to generate the transition of norms that we actually
observe.
• Symmetric cognitive dissonance:
μ = 0, αw = αb > 0. In this case, there is only updating due to own
behavior, but the personal norm is aﬀected symmetrically if one has
bought in the white and in the black market. Hence, γi2 > γi1 if one
bought in the white market and γi2 < γi1 if one bought in the black
market in the ﬁrst period.
• Asymmetric cognitive dissonance:
μ = 0, αw = 0, αb > 0. In this case, there is no updating according to
the network norm and it is only if one actually breaks the law that one
reduces the moral reluctance to buying black-market services. Hence,
γi2 = γi1 if one bought in the white market and γi2 < γi1 if one bought
in the black market in the ﬁrst period.
• Self-signaling:
μ = 0, αw = αγi1(1−γi1), αb = αγi1(γi1−1). In this case, individuals
in the middle are not aware of their own norms but will infer it from
their behavior. The more extreme γi1 people have, the more likely it
is that they are aware of their norms, and thus their behavior will not
alter their norms.
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• Normative conformity:
μ = 1. In this case, one updates the norm in order to conform with the
network norm and not depending on own behavior. Hence, γi2 > γi1 if
γi1 < γ¯i1 and γi2 < γi1 if γi1 > γ¯i1.
• Combination of conformity and cognitive dissonance:
μ ∈ (0, 1), αw > 0, αb > 0. In this case both mechanisms are eﬀective,
but the relative strength depends on μ.
• Network identification conformity:
αw = αb > 0. If |γi1−γ¯i1| > X, then μ = 0. If |γi1−γ¯i1| ≤ X, then μ ∈
(0, 1]. If one’s personal norm is too far from the average network norm,
then the identiﬁcation with the group is low and one is not inﬂuenced
by the network, but only updates the norm depending on one’s own
behavior. If, on the other hand, one has a strong identiﬁcation with the
group, then the inﬂuence from the social norm on the personal norm
is stronger. In the extreme case, which we will also simulate in Section
5, one either conforms with the group norm, i.e., μ = 1, or updates
depending on previous behavior, i.e., μ = 0.
• Asymmetric network identification conformity:
αw = αb > 0. If γi1 − γ¯i1 > 0 or if γ¯i1 − γi1 > X then μ = 0. If
|γi1 − γ¯i1| ≤ X, then μ ∈ (0, 1]. In this case one will not identify with
the group if one’s personal norm is above the average network norm11
or if it is too far below the average network norm. In these cases one is
not inﬂuenced by the network, but only updates the norm depending
on one’s own behavior. If, on the other hand, one identiﬁes with the
group, then the inﬂuence from the social norm on the personal norm
is stronger. In the extreme case, which we will also simulate in Section
5, one either conforms with the group norm, i.e., μ = 1, or updates
depending on previous behavior, i.e., μ = 0.
11c.f., Myles and Naylor (1996).
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5 Simulations
The simulations are made in an agent-based model and follow in spirit the
approach of Schelling (1971). We simply state the behavior of the agents,
determined by the theory presented above, and then investigate the aggregate
outcome. Just as in Shelling’s original model need to run the simulation
model and analyze the outcome in order to ascertain that there is a stable
equilibrium. This is the approach that we take and if the ratio of tax evaders
and the distributions over attitudes remain stable over time we consider the
model to be in equilibrium. The main diﬀerence compared to Shelling, who
considered racial segregation, is that in our case individuals change their
”race,” i.e. attitudes. When calibrating the model we are mainly interested
in obtaining plausible ratios for tax evasion. Agent-based models have been
used to analyze tax evasion previously; see, e.g., Hokamp and Pickhardt
(2010) and references therein.
5.1 Individuals and networks
Individuals live for at least one and at most two periods. They are randomly
connected in networks of N individuals and each individual has a unique
network. There are two generations alive at the same time and a young
person has more young than old people in his/her network ones and vice
versa. An individual, i, is born and receives a network consisting of some old
and mostly young people in the ﬁrst period. With some probability p < 1, i
survives into Period 2 and turns old. Then her network changes: A share ϑ of
the former young friends have now turned old and remain in the network, a
share (1−ϑ) of the former young have died and so have all the former old ones
in the network. Those in i’s network not surviving into Period 2 are replaced
by a new generation of young individuals. On average, the network size is
N = 50, while the share within the network that are not of the same age as
the network head is on average 20 percent. The total simulated population
consists of 10,000 individuals.
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5.2 Attitude distribution
When an individual enters the model as young, she receives an exogenous
attitude, γ1i, which we draw from a certain distribution. We choose to ap-
proximate the observations of the young people’s attitudes toward buying
black market services, γi ∈ [0, 1], as a normal distribution to resemble Fig-
ure 1. Clearly, this is a simpliﬁcation where we fail to account for the large
tails and the extreme concentration of responses in the middle. We simulate
a continuous distribution, but in order to resemble Figure 1, we divide the
whole distribution into seven septiles. The starting attitude distribution that
we simulate is presented in Figure 2. The moral attitude γi1 is on the X-axis,
where 0 means that it is totally accepted to buy black market services, and
1 means that it is totally unacceptable. The individual’s and her network’s
attitudes toward buying black market services then determine whether the
individual will buy from the black or from the white market as young. The
next, and most important, step is to apply an updating mechanism that
determines the individual’s attitude during old age.
Figure 2: Simulated attitudes of young
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5.3 Results
The present paper aims to explore how the attitudes of the young will evolve
under diﬀerent assumptions of the norm-updating process and whether we
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can come up with some updating mechanism that creates a long-run equilib-
rium with a distribution of norms of the old generation that resembles the
actual one in the right-hand panel of Figure 1. The diﬀerent old-age attitude
distributions presented in the ﬁgures below are the stochastic equilibria that
emerge when the model converges over time. In order to ﬁnd stable equilibria
we present the average of 100 periods (although the model often converges
already after three or four periods).
The results of the attitudes for the old individuals under the diﬀerent
norm-updating assumptions are presented below. Investigating the cognitive
dissonance eﬀect alone, with both the symmetric (in Figure 3) and the asym-
metric (when only cheaters were aﬀected, Figure 4) response, we see that it
is not possible to obtain a distribution for the old that is close to what we
observe in Figure 1. With asymmetric dissonance we manage to obtain the
move toward the lower extreme, yet the distribution of the majority does
not alter. With a symmetric attitude change there is an increase in both
extremes, but what is most important is that we are not able to maintain
the concentration in the middle.
Figure 3: Symmetric cognitive dissonance
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According to the self-signaling or self-perception mechanism, only those
with non-extreme attitudes will infer their attitudes from their behavior,
while the others already know their attitudes and therefore do not change
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Figure 4: Asymmetric cognitive dissonance: only if cheating
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them. In this case we have a clear shift away from the middle, since they are
the only ones who update their norms; see Figure 5.
Figure 5: Self-signaling
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By solely updating the norms based on own behavior, we are therefore not
able to generate the observed old-age distribution from the initial distribution
in Figure 2.
Next, we investigate the old-age equilibrium when instead updating norms
according to normative group conformity. Then we obtain a clear concen-
tration in the middle but there is no move toward the extreme values; see
Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Normative conformity
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The normative conformity theory is thus not able to explain the obser-
vation either. By combining normative conformity with symmetric cognitive
dissonance (see Figure 7), we obtain a similar pattern as for the symmetric
cognitive dissonance in Figure 3, yet not as extreme since normative confor-
mity smooths the eﬀect. Moreover, since the dissonance eﬀect dominates,
the peak has moved to the right.
Figure 7: Symmetric dissonance and group conformity
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Above we tested combining the cognitive dissonance with normative con-
formity simultaneously, in the same way for all individuals. But what if
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one decides to update either according to cognitive dissonance or accord-
ing to normative conformity based on whether or not one identiﬁes with the
network? If the individual identiﬁes with the group, she updates the norm
according to the normative conformity theory. But if not, i.e., if the indi-
vidual’s attitude diﬀers too much from the mean attitude of the group, she
instead updates her norm in accordance with cognitive dissonance. Figure 8
shows that this norm-evolution process is able to generate both a concentra-
tion in the middle and a move toward the extremes simultaneously, and hence
a similar outcome as the observed one. The match to the observed distribu-
tion is far from perfect, though, since the simulations result in a symmetric
move toward the extremes.
Figure 8: Group identiﬁcation: either group conformity or cognitive disso-
nance
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Finally, we test for another group identiﬁcation criterion, namely that one
will only be inﬂuenced by the network if one’s personal norm is below the
average network norm, but not too far below. Hence, one needs to identify
with the network to conform with it, but if one feels that one has a ”stronger
morale” than one’s peers, then one is not inﬂuenced by them. This is what
we call the asymmetric network identiﬁcation conformity. With this type of
updating, the old will hold preferences that are distributed as in Figure 9;
hence we are able to obtain the observed asymmetry with these heterogenous
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and asymmetric updating mechanisms. In this case the long-run equilibrium
of the simulated model actually replicates the observed distribution.
Figure 9: Asymmetric group identiﬁcation: either group conformity or cog-
nitive dissonance
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to explain the mechanisms behind the common
observation that young and old hold very diﬀerent moral attitudes in general.
We have particularly focused on the attitudes toward buying black-market
services, where Figure 1 shows the distributions of the moral views of the
young and old, respectively. The old are more reluctant, yet are also more
polarized in their attitudes than the young.
Although our example is a speciﬁc one, the line of reasoning is applicable
to other topics as well. Our explanation to the attitudinal diﬀerences is that it
is a result of the formation of endogenous norms, implying that the observed
diﬀerences may be an age eﬀect rather than a cohort eﬀect. We propose a
theoretical model where, apart from material incentives, people may ﬁnd it
immoral to buy illegal black market services. One may therefore feel guilty if
one acts in opposition to one’s own moral values. Moreover, people interact
with each other in social networks and feel ashamed if they act in opposition
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to the average norm in their network. Hence, both personal and social norms
hamper the occurrence of buying black market services, which has also been
proposed in previous literature (e.g., Myles and Naylor, 1996; Wenzel, 2004,
2005b; Kirchler, 2007).
Even more importantly, we model the evolvement of norms depending
on diﬀerent psychological mechanisms: cognitive dissonance or self-signaling
on the one hand and normative conformity on the other. Due to cognitive
dissonance or self-signaling, one’s preference as old is inﬂuenced by one’s
behavior as young. Since we actually observe a minority engaging in the
illegal activity, these mechanisms could explain why the older are not only
more polarized in their views but also on average more reluctant to buying
black market services. Normative conformity, on the other hand, makes one
approach the average moral value in one’s network, at least if one identi-
ﬁes with the network. Hence, our paper not only addresses the question of
endogenous social norms as such, we also propose in what ways they may
evolve over the life cycle.
in addition, to see whether a distribution of personal norms like the one
we observe for young people could transform into the one we observe for
elderly, we took our model to an agent based simulation model by applying
the utility maximization and norm updating from our theoretical model. We
found that none of our suggested updating mechanisms alone can explain the
transition. Not even a combination of the two, where relative weights are the
same for everyone, can. However, when we allow for heterogeneous updating
mechanisms, where people with strong identiﬁcation with their networks are
more prone to conform with their ”more moral” peers, and those who do not
identify with their network are instead inﬂuenced by their own past behavior
in altering their personal norms, we are able to replicate the observed pattern
as an equilibrium. Then we can explain how the young population (with a
normal distribution of preferences), when they turn old, will hold preferences
with still a large share in the middle, but also a very large fraction thinking
that it is completely immoral to buy black market services and a smaller, yet
substantial, share who think it is completely justiﬁable.
Of course, we have not proven that our explanation is the true one; there
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could be other explanations as well. However, we have presented a plausible
theory that is consistent with suggestions in previous literature and that is
able to explain the transition from one observed norm distribution to another.
Hence, we ﬁnd it likely that the diﬀerence between the generations actually
is an age eﬀect, so that today’s young people, when they turn old, may hold
personal norms similar to today’s old, which in turn means that we will not
see an erosion of society’s tax morale due to the younger generation’s more
permissive attitudes.
Our ﬁndings have important policy implications: since previous behavior
aﬀect norms, which in turn aﬀects consequent behavior, policies that aﬀect
behavior may have more long-term eﬀects than what is usually assumed (see
also Funk, 2005). Increased audits in one period or a temporary tax reduction
would reduce the expected gain from buying in the black market and would
thus make more people buy in the white market instead. This would result
in a generally higher reluctance to black market services, which could make
people abstain from buying in the black market also in the future. Moreover,
since people update their norms heterogeneously, general policies will be less
eﬀective than targeted ones. Young people who evade taxes are more likely
the ones with less tax morale, and targeted actions towards them may be
important to combat overall tax evasion.
Although we have analyzed a speciﬁc topic, this paper has given a hint
of how we should think of dynamic norm evolution. It is likely that both
our own past behavior and the attitudes of our peers inﬂuence our moral
judgements. Moreover, it may well be the case that diﬀerent people update
their norms according to diﬀerent mechanisms. Hence, it would be desirable
to analyze endogenous norm formation in the aggregate also in areas other
than tax morale.
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